Writing
Past Work
Here find a sample of my past published work
Socratic Wisdom in the Apology and Charmides (2024)
Vlastos presents a paradox of Socratic ignorance: if Socrates disavows all knowledge, great and small, then how is he confident he has lived a moral life? I propose Socrates is wise not because of what secrets of the gods he knows, or even what things he does not know, but because he has second-order knowledge of what he knows and that he does not know. I will examine the Apology for two kinds of second-order “negative content” knowledge—Socrates does not suppose what he does not know, and Socrates is aware of not being wise in things great or small. I will then examine the Charmides for another kind of positive content of second-order Socratic knowledge in the form of sōphrosunē—Socrates knows what he himself does know.
The question of what comprises Socratic wisdom is an extant problem in the literature. Reeve issued a challenge: if awareness of ignorance is the negative content of Socratic wisdom, what is the positive content? In Apology, what Reeve terms “negative content” of Socratic wisdom a conflation of both negative content of first-order knowledge—Socrates does not suppose he knows what he does not—and positive content of second-order knowledge—Socrates is aware he is not wise in things great or small. In Charmides, the virtue sōphrosunē is second-order knowledge of what Socrates does know. This self-knowledge of what he knows is another answer to Reeve’s search for “positive” content of Socratic wisdom. The intersection of “negative” and “positive” content is Socratic wisdom. This therefore solves for Vlastos’ paradox of Socratic ignorance as well, because Socrates’ second-order knowledge of his own knowledge and lack thereof is distinct from knowledge of the gods, either great or small. Therefore Socrates can disavow godly wisdom, while at the same time assured that he has lived a virtuous life, as he is the exemplar of virtuous self-knowledge (of what he knows and does not).
Upcoming Work
Here find a sample of my planned and upcoming work. In academic year 2025-2026, I taught a 7/7 workload at three different universities. This left little time for writing but plenty of time for planning, and this upcoming academic year I hope to develop several of the papers I planned into full-fledged published pieces. Some of them, such as the "Banned from Campus" paper, I workshopped as a public talk.
Banned from Campus: The Pedagogical Importance of Plato's Symposium (2026)
In January of 2026, Texas A&M banned Plato’s Symposium over “race and gender ideology.” College syllabi across the country include this philosophical dialogue about a drinking party between friends. But what good comes from teaching it? Perhaps the controversy of its contents outweighs its pedagogical benefits. I propose six reasons why any philosophy syllabus is poorer without it. First, the structure of the dialogue teaches philosophical argumentation through its presentation of speech, rebuttal, speech. Second, its topic of Love is both relevant and relatable to college students from all backgrounds. Third, it is one of three places where Plato’s metaphysical “Forms” are most directly described, next to the “divided line” in the Republic and his Parmenides. Fourth, the use of Diotima and descriptions of philosophy as midwifery provide representation to women philosophers. Fifth, its representation of homosexual, sapphic, heterosexual, and even asexual love show students that people in the past are much like people in the present and love manifests in a variety of configurations. And finally, yes, there is “radical” ideology in the Symposium, as measured by Texas A&M’s yardstick, which is exactly why Plato’s Symposium remains essential reading for young philosophers today.
Taxonomy of Number in Aristotle's Metaphysics M
Throughout Metaphysics M, Aristotle systematically tests different categories of number against his “separability” criterion, in order to show that mathematicals, in spite of Plato’s best efforts, cannot exist separately from sensibles. This testing follows a taxonomy which, although not explicitly described in Metaphysics M itself, we can reproduce the shape of via a careful exegesis of the text. This paper will do that.
This is a survey into how Aristotle taxonomizes number in Metaphysics M. To this end, first I will explain very briefly the “separability” criterion which Aristotle uses throughout M. Then I will define two different types of number, continuous and discrete, the distinction between which actually obfuscates Aristotle’s operative distinction throughout the book. Next I will explain exactly that issue: why the operative distinction is between Ideal and mathematical numbers, not magnitudes and arithmetic number, and how that confusion arises. The main focus of the paper is what divisions Aristotle makes to create his taxonomy for the numbers. I will then place all the arguments in Metaphysics M into these categories as much as is possible. In the end, then, we will be left with a clear picture of where to cut numbers at the joints, thus informing future examinations of number theory in the ancient world.